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THE RIGHT TO “SKYPE”: THE DUE PROCESS CONCERNS OF
VIDEOCONFERENCING AT PAROLE REVOCATION HEARINGS
Kacey Marr*

I. INTRODUCTION
In 2009, Christopher Thompson was returned to prison after he
violated the conditions of his supervised release.1 Prior to his
revocation, the district court in Rockford, Illinois, held a revocation
hearing, at which all parties were physically present except for the
judge, who participated by videoconference from Key West, Florida.2
Thompson appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
challenging the judge’s decision to conduct the revocation hearing by
videoconference.3 His appeal required the Seventh Circuit to confront a
question of first impression for federal courts of appeals: whether the
use of videoconferencing to conduct a revocation hearing violated Rule
32.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure4 or, alternatively, the
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.5
Although no federal circuit had previously confronted this exact
issue, the question of the constitutional and statutory validity of the use
of videoconferencing technology by the judicial system was far from
novel. As technology has advanced rapidly, the judiciary has been faced
with a surge of new, unforeseen issues that it has had to resolve without
legislative direction.6 The invention of videoconferencing appeared to

* Associate Member, 2011–12 University of Cincinnati Law Review.
1. United States v. Thompson, 599 F.3d 595, 597 (7th Cir. 2010).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1. Rule 32.1 governs the revocation or modification of probation of
supervised release. Rule 32.1(b)(2) governs revocation hearings and provides, in pertinent part, that:
“Unless waived by the person, the court must hold the revocation hearing within a reasonable time in the
district having jurisdiction. The person is entitled to: (A) written notice of the alleged violation; (B)
disclosure of the evidence against the person; (C) an opportunity to appear, present evidence, and
question any adverse witness unless the court determines that the interest of justice does not require the
witness to appear; (D) notice of the person’s right to retain counsel or to request that counsel be
appointed if the person cannot obtain counsel; and (E) an opportunity to make a statement and present
any information in mitigation.”
5. Thompson, 599 F.3d at 596–97.
6. These problems are not unique to criminal law. One author has discussed a related issue in
the system of intellectual property rights, stating, “Once a relatively slow and ponderous process,
technological change is now outpacing the legal structure that governs the system, and is creating
pressures on Congress to adjust the law to accommodate these changes.” Ivan K. Fong, Law and New
Technology: The Virtues of Muddling Through, 19 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 443, 443 (2001) (quoting
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AN AGE OF ELECTRONICS
AND INFORMATION 3 (1986)).
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many district courts and government agencies to be a perfect solution to
inefficient, time-consuming, and costly procedures clogging up dockets
around the country.7 Even the Judicial Conference of the United States,8
the governing body of the federal courts, encouraged the use of
videoconferencing systems in the courtroom.9 By 2002, approximately
eighty-five percent of federal district courts had access to
videoconferencing equipment in at least one of their courtrooms.10
Criminal defendants quickly reacted by challenging the constitutional
and statutory validity of the use of videoconferencing technology at the
proceedings at which their liberty was at stake.11 In response, multiple
federal courts of appeals rejected the use of videoconferencing in
criminal proceedings governed by Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure,12 including all proceedings leading up to and
including sentencing, because the procedure violated a defendant’s
statutory and constitutional rights—rights which could not be

7. See, e.g., United States v. Navarro, 169 F.3d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1999) (“The
Government . . . argues that [videoconferencing] is widely used, that it is beneficial because it increases
productivity by reducing travel time, and that it is less costly and more safe than transporting
prisoners.”); United States v. Torres-Palma, 290 F.3d 1244, 1245 (10th Cir. 2002) (“The [district] court
concluded video conferencing would provide an ideal solution” to the impracticalities and timeliness
issues of a judge travelling to another state to pronounce a sentence “because the defendant would be
able to communicate with and see the court, and the court would have the ability to see and hear the
defendant.”); Terrell v. United States, 564 F.3d 442, 445 (6th Cir. 2009) (explaining that the Parole
Commission’s “proffered reason [for allowing conducting parole hearings by videoconference] was ‘to
reduce travel costs and conserve the time of its hearing examiners’ without diminishing the prisoner’s
ability to effectively participate in the hearing”).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2006). The Conference consists of each judicial circuit’s chief judge, the
Chief Judge of the Court of International Trade, and a district judge from each regional circuit, and is
presided over by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. Id.
9. See Elizabeth C. Wiggins, What We Know and What We Need to Know About the Effects of
Courtroom Technology, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 731, 731 (2003–2004) (referencing the
Conference’s approval of the recommendation of its Committee on Automation and Technology
endorsing the use of certain technologies, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS, REP. OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF
THE U.S. JUD. CONF. 8 (Mar. 1999)).
10. Id. at 732–33. This statistic was derived from a June 2002 survey of all federal district courts
by the Federal Judicial Center concerning the use of technology in district and magistrate judge
courtrooms, to which ninety of the ninety-four districts responded. Id.
11. Id. at 737 (discussing defense lawyers’ concerns that videoconferencing in certain criminal
proceedings interfered with the right to due process and adequate representation, as well as with the
right to due process and a fair trial); see also United States v. Thompson, 599 F.3d 595, 597 (7th Cir.
2010) (“Thompson appealed [his reimprisonment], challenging the judge’s decision to conduct the
revocation hearing by videoconference.”); Terrell, 564 F.3d at 444 (explaining that Terrell filed a
petition for writ of habeas corpus “asking the court to order in-person parole determination hearings”
instead of the scheduled hearing by videoconference); Navarro, 169 F.3d at 231 (noting Navarro
“challenges his sentencing by video conferencing as violative of” Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
43).
12. FED. R. CRIM. P. 43. Rule 43 requires that a criminal defendant be present at the initial
appearance, the initial arraignment, and the plea, as well as every trial stage, including jury
impanelment, the return of the verdict, and sentencing. FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(a).
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outweighed by efficiency concerns.13
Courts and government agencies have since implemented the use of
videoconferencing technology in post-conviction proceedings, including
probation, parole, and supervised release revocation hearings.14 Like the
parallel line of cases involving Rule 43 criminal proceedings, the courts
of appeals are beginning to strike down the practice, but only on
statutory grounds.15 This trend appears to rest on the general principle
of judicial restraint that requires courts to avoid constitutional questions
if statutory analysis is sufficient.16
However, in the absence of legislation or a decision from the United
States Supreme Court, there remains the potential that federal courts, as
well as state courts ruling on similar state statutes, could find that
videoconferencing does not violate a parolee’s statutory rights.17 It is
13. See United States v. Torres-Palma, 290 F.3d 1244, 1248 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that
videoconferencing at sentencing violated Rule 43); United States v. Lawrence, 248 F.3d 300, 303–04
(4th Cir. 2001) (same); Navarro, 169 F.3d at 235–39 (same); Valenzuela-Gonzalez v. U.S. Dist. Court
for Dist. of Ariz., 915 F.2d 1276, 1280 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that videoconferencing at arraignment
violated Rule 43’s presence requirement and Rule 10’s requirement that arraignments be held in “open
court”).
14. See Terrell, 564 F.3d at 454–55 (holding that the use of videoconferencing at parole
determination hearings violates the Parole Commission Reorganization Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201–18
(1976)); Thompson, 599 F.3d at 596–97 (holding that the use of videoconferencing at parole revocation
hearings violates the defendant’s statutory right to appear). The term “parolee” will be used to
encompass all defendants who are subject to any form of release supervision, including parole and
supervised release. Both the United States Supreme Court and authors of scholarly articles have viewed
the forms of release supervision as synonymous because the rights of each are often interchangeable.
See, e.g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 478, 782 n.3 (1973) (noting that “[d]espite the undoubted minor
differences between probation and parole, the . . . revocation of probation where sentence has been
imposed previously is constitutionally indistinguishable from the revocation of parole”); Bruce Zucker,
The Right to Confront Adverse Witnesses at Post-Conviction Release Revocation Hearings, 34 NEW
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 87, 87 n.3 (2008) (referring to all forms of post-incarceration
release supervision as “parole” because courts have found that the rights afforded to each are often
interchangeable). Likewise, the term “revocation hearing” will be used to encompass parole, probation,
and supervised release revocation hearings.
15. See Thompson, 599 F.3d at 596.
16. See, e.g., Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 445 (1988) (noting,
“A fundamental and longstanding principle of judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching
constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them”). But is this exercise of judicial
restraint wise? This doctrine, like the immunity doctrine, is evidence that there is not always a
constitutional right to a remedy, even where there is a constitutional violation and a right to judicial
review of such violation. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial
Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 313, 337 (1993) (discussing the
juxtaposition often created by the due process doctrine). According to Fallon, “recognition that the Due
Process Clause does not require a remedy for every constitutional violation throws into doubt the
prevalent assumption of another pocket of due process law that the Constitution requires judicial review
of all constitutional claims,” and that “[u]ltimately, the crucial question is whether the governing
principles are good ones.” Id. at 311, 372.
17. In fact, a court’s decision to find that physical presence is not required by statute is more than
a possibility, it is a reality. In 1983, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that a
defendant’s absence from a Rule 43 proceeding would not always be a violation of his or her statutory
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also possible that Congress will amend the rule to allow
videoconferencing at parole revocation hearings.18 Therefore, the due
process rights undermined by the use of videoconferencing technology
deserve the judiciary’s attention, particularly the right to effective
assistance of counsel and the right to confront adverse witnesses. This
Comment will address these issues.
Part II of this Comment examines the background of parallel cases
leading up to the Seventh Circuit’s 2010 decision in United States v.
Thompson, including cases concerning Rule 43 criminal proceedings
decided on statutory and constitutional grounds. Part II also examines
Terrell v. United States, in which the Sixth Circuit decided a case
regarding the use of videoconferencing strictly by statutory
interpretation. Part III then analyzes the Seventh Circuit’s Thompson
decision. Part IV examines the due process rights granted to parolees by
the Supreme Court as well as lower federal courts. Part V discusses the
underlying due process concerns implicated by the use of
videoconferencing technology at parole revocation hearings, particularly
the parolee’s right to effective assistance of counsel and the right to
confront adverse witnesses. In conclusion, this Comment will argue that
“Skyping in”19 parolees to hearings at which their liberty is at stake
violates their due process rights and should be rejected by courts.
II. EARLY CASES CONFRONTING THE USE OF VIDEOCONFERENCING
Beginning in the 1990s, defendants who appeared at their criminal
proceedings or parole determination hearings by videoconferencing
technology contested the constitutional and statutory validity of the

right to be present. United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489, 492 (D.C. Cir. 1983). There, the
defendant argued that her right to be present during voir dire under Rule 43(a) was violated when a
portion of it was conducted at a bench conference, out of her direct observation and range of hearing.
Id. at 493. Oddly, the court discussed at length the purpose and necessity of the Rule 43 presence
requirement before dismissing the defendant’s contention as harmless error. Id. at 496–98. The court
noted that the requirement “implements a leading principle that . . . nothing shall be done in the absence
of the prisoner.” Id. at 496–97 (internal quotations omitted). The court also said that “the defendant’s
right to be present is an essential concomitant of a defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel”
and that the right to confront adverse witnesses “may require knowing participation by the defendant to
be fully exercised.” Id. at 497.
18. Other Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure have already been amended to allow the use of
videoconferencing technology where the individual consents, including Rule 5 (permitting
videoconferencing at initial appearances only if the defendant consents) and Rule 10 (permitting the use
of videoconferencing for arraignments only if the defendant consents). FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(f), 10(c).
19. “Skyping” is a slang term that refers to when a person uses Skype, an online program that
allows for many types of computer-to-computer communication, for the purpose of videoconferencing.
See Facts on Skyping, EHOW.COM, http://www.ehow.com/about_ 6614558_ skyping.html (last visited
June 7, 2013).
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practice.20 Despite the practice’s endorsement by many district courts
and government agencies, including the governing body of the federal
courts, multiple courts of appeals quickly denounced the practice.21
A. Videoconferencing at Rule 43 Criminal Proceedings
In the 1990s and early 2000s, circuit courts first considered whether
the use of videoconferencing at a criminal proceeding governed by Rule
4322 satisfies the statutory requirement that a defendant be “present.”23
Since that time, the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held
that the use of videoconferencing at Rule 43 proceedings violates a
defendant’s statutory rights.24
For example, the Tenth Circuit confronted this issue in 2002 in
United States v. Torres-Palma. In Torres-Palma, the defendant
appeared by videoconference at his sentencing, which took place in a
different state than where the judge presided.25 In determining that Rule
43 required a defendant to be physically present at sentencing,26 the
court concluded that the content and the plain reading of the text of Rule
43, along with the Webster’s Dictionary and Black’s Law Dictionary
definitions of presence and present, mandated that physical presence
was required.27
The Torres-Palma court also discussed the United States v. Navarro
decision from the Fifth Circuit, which analyzed the constitutional
implications of the physical presence requirement.28 In Navarro, the
20. See United States v. Torres-Palma, 290 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 2002) (challenging the use of
videoconferencing at Rule 43 sentencing proceedings); United States v. Lawrence, 248 F.3d 300, 303–
04 (4th Cir. 2001) (same); United States v. Navarro, 169 F.3d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1999) (same);
Valenzuela-Gonzalez v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Ariz., 915 F.2d 1276, 1276 (9th Cir. 2000)
(challenging the use of videoconferencing at a Rule 43 arraignment).
21. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
22. Rule 43 requires a defendant’s presence at “(1) the initial appearance, the initial arraignment,
and the plea; (2) every trial stage, including jury impanelment and the return of the verdict; and (3)
sentencing.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(a).
23. See United States v. Burke, 345 F.3d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting the Fourth, Fifth,
Ninth, and Tenth Circuit’s decisions holding that the use of videoconferencing at Rule 43 proceedings
violated the presence requirement).
24. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
25. Torres-Palma, 290 F.3d at 1245. The presiding judge’s district was not located in New
Mexico because, at the time, judges from other districts in the Tenth Circuit were voluntarily presiding
over the New Mexico criminal docket because of the unusually high incidence of criminal cases
involving across the border transactions with Mexico coupled with the limited judicial resources in the
District of New Mexico.
26. Id. at 1248. The Tenth Circuit, however, took the analysis one step further and held that,
because “Rule 43 vindicates a central principle of the criminal justice system, violation [of it] is per se
prejudicial,” and that, therefore, a showing or prejudice is irrelevant. Id.
27. Id. at 1247.
28. Id.
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Fifth Circuit noted that the rights protected by Rule 43 include not only
due process rights and the common law right to be present, but also the
right of a defendant to meet face-to-face with witnesses appearing
before the trier of fact, as governed by the Confrontation Clause.29
After the Tenth Circuit’s decision and the decisions of its sister
circuits, it was clear that, even though the use of videoconferencing
could increase productivity and save money,30 the technology was not
appropriate for Rule 43 proceedings because it violated both the
statutory and constitutional rights of criminal defendants.
B. Videoconferencing at Parole Determination Hearings
After a seven year hiatus, the issue of videoconferencing in criminal
proceedings resurfaced in the context of parole determination hearings.31
In 2004, the United States Parole Commission launched a pilot project
to conduct parole release hearings by videoconference at a few
institutions by promulgating new rules that eliminated the “in person”
requirement for hearings and allowed for videoconferencing.32 The
reason for the project, according to the commission, “was to reduce
travel costs and conserve the time of its hearing examiners without
diminishing the prisoner’s ability to effectively participate in the
hearing.”33 One year later, the commission announced that the pilot
program successfully met its objectives and extended the use of
videoconferencing to parole determination hearings.34
In Terrell v. United States, the Sixth Circuit addressed the validity of
29. United States v. Navarro, 169 F.3d 228, 236–37 (5th Cir. 1999). The court noted that the
Confrontation Clause provides for constitutional protection in all stages of trial except for sentencing.
Id. at 236. Therefore, it concluded, “Video conferencing would seemingly violate a defendant’s
Confrontation Clause rights at those other stages of trial.” Id. at 237. The Confrontation Clause states,
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with witnesses
against him.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
30. See, e.g., Navarro, 169 F.3d at 235 (acknowledging the government’s contention that
videoconferencing is “beneficial because it increases productivity by reducing travel time, and . . . is less
costly and more safe than transporting prisoners”).
31. See Terrell v. United States, 564 F.3d 442, 454–55 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that the use of
videoconferencing at parole determination hearings violates the Parole Commission Reorganization Act,
18 U.S.C. §§ 4201–18 (1976)).
32. Id. at 445. The 2002 amended rules apply to the parole system as governed by the Parole
Commission Reorganization Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201–18 (1976), though parole was replaced with
supervised release in 1984 by the Sentencing Reform Act, Pub.L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984).
Terrell, 564 F.3d at 444. However, Congress continued to amend the Parole Commission
Reorganization Act because the reform does not apply to prisoners who committed offenses prior to
November 1, 1987, who remain eligible for parole proceedings. Id. at 444–45.
33. Terrell, 564 F.3d at 445 (quoting the Commission’s published notice, “Paroling,
Recommitting, and Supervising Federal Prisoners: Prisoners Serving Sentences Under the United States
and District of Columbia Codes,” 69 Fed. Reg. 5,273 (Feb. 4, 2004)).
34. Id. at 445.
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the commission decision to allow videoconferencing at parole
determination hearings.35 Terrell filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus after being scheduled for an interim parole hearing by
videoconference, requesting the court to order an in-person parole
determination hearing.36 The magistrate judge recommended the court
deny his petition, and his hearing was held via videoconference.37 The
district court subsequently held that the use of videoconferencing
violated his due process rights and ordered an in-person parole
determination hearing.38 This decision was appealed to the Sixth
Circuit, who also granted a stay at the request of the government
pending its determination of the validity of the procedure.39
Terrell contended that the commission violated his statutory and
constitutional rights when it denied his request for an in-person
hearing.40 Specifically, he argued that the use of videoconferencing
violated his due process rights and 18 U.S.C. § 4208(e), which requires
that a prisoner “be allowed to appear and testify on his own behalf at the
parole determination proceeding.”41
The Sixth Circuit first considered the statutory argument and held that
§ 4208(e) was unambiguous at the time it was enacted and, even though
videoconferencing did not exist at that time, no subsequent
technological development could change the fact that “appear” required
an in-person hearing.42 In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on
the ordinary meaning of appear, as well as the entire statutory scheme.43
The court then briefly dismissed Terrell’s constitutional argument by
saying that its conclusion on statutory grounds made it unnecessary for
it to reach the issue of whether videoconferencing violated due
process.44

35. Id. at 442.
36. Id. at 444.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 445.
41. Id. 18 U.S.C. § 4208 governs the parole determination proceeding as part of the Parole
Commission Reorganization Act of 1976. Terrell was subject to the parole proceedings as opposed to
the Sentencing Reform Act’s supervised release proceedings because he pled guilty to robbing three
banks in 1983, which was four years prior to the effective date of the Sentencing Reform Act. Terrell,
564 F.3d at 444.
42. Id. at 449–50.
43. Id. at 451–52.
44. Id. at 454. The court likely made this decision based on the “fundamental and long-standing
principle of judicial restraint [which] requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in
advance of the necessity of deciding them.” Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S.
439, 445 (1988).
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III. UNITED STATES V. THOMPSON
Christopher Thompson, who served a prison term for robbing two
banks and a shorter term for violating his first supervised release, was
arrested for multiple driving infractions while out on supervision.45 He
violated a condition of his release by failing to notify his probation
officer of his arrest within seventy-two hours.46 Because of these
violations, the government sought to revoke Thompson’s supervised
release for the second time and return him to prison.47
The district court first held an initial hearing to appoint counsel for
Thompson and schedule his revocation hearing.48 All parties were
present in the Illinois courthouse except for the judge, who participated
by videoconference from Key West, Florida.49 The parties reassembled
the following week in the judge’s courtroom for the parole revocation
hearing, again with the judge appearing by videoconference.50 Counsel
for Thompson objected, arguing that the judge’s appearance by
videoconference violated Rule 32.1, which governs the procedures for
revoking or modifying probation or supervised release.51 The district
court, however, overruled the objection, stating that “[t]he court believes
that video conferencing for a supervised release hearing meets the
standards of due process, that there’s no case law that would prohibit it
nor any rule or statute that would prohibit it.”52 The hearing proceeded,
and the court heard statements from both parties’ counsel and
Thompson, who admitted to all but one allegation.53 The judge then
revoked Thompson’s supervised release and sentenced him to twelve
months in prison and one year of supervised release.54 Thompson
appealed to the Seventh Circuit.
Thompson’s appeal presented the Seventh Circuit with a question of
first impression for federal courts of appeals.55 Namely, whether the use
of videoconferencing to conduct a revocation hearing violates Rule 32.1
45. United States v. Thompson, 599 F.3d 595, 596–97 (7th Cir. 2010). Thompson violated his
first supervised release when he was caught using illegal drugs. Id. After serving six additional months
in prison, Thompson was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol, operating an uninsured
motor vehicle, driving with a suspended license, speeding, and improper lane usage. Id. at 597.
46. Id. at 597.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.; FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1.
52. Thompson, 599 F.3d at 597.
53. Id. The only allegation Thompson did not admit was his drunk-driving charge.
54. Id. The judge imposed the twelve month sentence even though the probation officer
recommended only eight months. Id.
55. Id.
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or, alternatively, whether it violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause.56 The court first turned to Rule 32.1 and analyzed the meaning
of its language by referring to definitional standards, parallel cases, and
other Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.57 The court also determined
a defendant’s rights under Rule 32.1.58
Thompson argued that the district court must give the defendant an
“opportunity to appear,” as provided in Rule 32.1(b)(2), which requires
the defendant and the judge to be physically present in the same
courtroom.59 The court agreed with his contention, and in reaching this
result, referred to the meaning of appear and to the traditional
understanding of an accused person’s appearance before a court
empowered to deprive him of his liberty.60 It noted that both the
Webster’s Dictionary and the Black’s Law Dictionary define appear and
appearance so as to suggest that an appearance can only occur if the
parolee comes into the physical presence of the judge.61
The court supported its conclusion by examining the Sixth Circuit’s
decision in Terrell, where the court held that the use of
videoconferencing did not satisfy a parole statute’s requirement that a
“prisoner shall be allowed to appear and testify on his behalf at the
parole determination proceeding.”62 The Sixth Circuit found that “to
appear mean[s] to be physically present.”63 Although Terrell involved a
different statute, the Seventh Circuit noted that the Sixth Circuit’s
56. Id. at 596–97.
57. Id. at 599–601. Before analyzing Rule 32.1, the court determined that Rule 43 was not the
appropriate rule under which to determine the propriety of videoconferencing because it does not
explicitly provide for post-trial proceedings such as revocation hearings. Id. at 598. But, before
discarding the Rule 43 analysis, the court also noted a parallel issue other circuits have confronted:
Whether the use of videoconferencing violated the Rule 43 “presence” requirement. Id. In all three
circuits referenced, the courts held that physical presence was required of all parties and the judge. Id.
(citing United States v. Torres-Palma, 290 F.3d 1244, 1247–48 (10th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Lawrence, 248 F.3d 300, 305 (4th Cir. 2001); United States v. Navarro, 169 F.3d 228, 238–39 (5th Cir.
1999)). The court also distinguished Rule 43 from Rule 32.1 based on the rights at stake in proceedings
governed by each Rule. Thompson, 599 F.3d at 598. Citing the U.S. Supreme Court, the court noted
that “a defendant at a revocation hearing is not owed the full panoply of rights due a defendant at
sentencing” and that “revocation deprives an individual, not of the absolute liberty to which every
citizen is entitled, but only of the conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special parole
restrictions.” Id. (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)).
58. Thompson, 599 F.3d at 599–601.
59. Id. at 599; FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(b)(2).
60. Thompson, 599 F.3d at 599–600.
61. Id. at 599. Webster’s Dictionary defines “appear” as “to come formally before an
authoritative body” and Black’s Law Dictionary defines “appearance” as a “coming into court as a party
or interested person, or as a lawyer on behalf of a party or interested person.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 103 (1981); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 113 (9th ed. 2009).
62. Thompson, 599 F.3d at 600 (quoting Terrell v. United States, 564 F.3d 442 (6th Cir. 2009),
regarding 18 U.S.C. § 4208(e)).
63. Id. at 600 (quoting Terrell, 564 F.3d at 451) (emphasis added).
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decision highlighted that the form and substantive quality of a hearing is
altered when either the defendant or the judge is absent from the hearing
room, even if he or she is participating by videoconference.64
The Seventh Circuit also referred to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Escoe v. Zerbst, in which the Supreme Court determined that a lower
court’s decision to revoke a defendant’s probation without a hearing
violated the requirement that he be “brought before the court.”65
Although Escoe pre-dated videoconferencing technology, and the
Internet for that matter, the case provided the traditional legal
understanding of a person’s appearance.66 In Escoe, the Court held that
“‘the end and aim of an appearance before the court’ under the statute
was to ‘enable an accused [parolee] to explain away the accusation,’ and
this required ‘bringing the [parolee] into the presence of his judge.’”67
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit referenced the statutory language of
other Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that explicitly allow for the
use of videoconferencing.68
The court reasoned that, since
videoconferencing is permitted only with stated exceptions in the rules,
the use of the technology “is the exception to the rule, not the default
rule itself,” and that Rule 32.1’s “opportunity to appear,” therefore,
excludes appearance by videoconference.69
During its interpretation of the opportunity to appear, the court also
examined the statutory rights owed to a defendant at a revocation
hearing. Rule 32.1 provides, in pertinent part, that:
The person is entitled to: . . . (C) an opportunity to appear, present
evidence, and question any adverse witness . . . ; [and] (D) notice of the
person’s right to retain counsel or to request that counsel be appointed if
the person cannot obtain counsel . . . .70

After determining that the opportunity to appear requires a parolee to
come into the physical presence of the judge, the court furthered its
statutory analysis by noting that this right is not isolated, but instead
exists in conjunction with the right to “present evidence,” to “question
any adverse witness,” and to “make a statement and present any

64. Id.
65. Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1935). The Thompson Court noted the obvious difference
between a hearing by videoconference and no hearing at all. Thompson, 599 F.3d at 600. However, the
court still found the case informative for the interpretation of “appearance” required by Rule 32.1. Id.
66. Thompson, 599 F.3d at 600.
67. Id. (quoting Escoe, 295 U.S. at 492–94).
68. Id. at 600. These Rules include Rule 5 (permitting videoconferencing at initial appearances
only if the defendant consents) and Rule 10 (permitting the use of videoconferencing for arraignments
only if the defendant consents). Id.
69. Id. at 600–01.
70. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(b)(2).
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information in mitigation.”71 The court reasoned that a parolee’s
appearance in court is “the means by which he effectuates the other
rights conferred” by Rule 32.1.72
The conjunctive force of a defendant’s opportunity to appear is
particularly important to the defendant’s right to “make a statement and
present any information in mitigation” because “appearing before the
court allows the [parolee] to plead his case personally to the [deciding]
judge.”73 This right, known as the right of allocution, “ensures that the
defendant has the opportunity to ‘personally address the court’ before
punishment is imposed.”74 Without the physical meeting, the court
reasoned, the judge could not experience the impressions of any
personal confrontation wherein he or she attempts to assess the parolee’s
credibility or to evaluate the defendant’s true moral fiber.75
Consequently, without the personal, physical interaction between a
judge and a parolee, the force of the parolee’s other rights guaranteed by
Rule 32.1 is diminished.76
Finally, after determining that the judge’s participation by
videoconferencing in Thompson’s revocation hearing violated Rule
32.1, the court vacated Thompson’s term of reimprisonment and
remanded.77 The court resolved the second issue, whether
videoconferencing violated Thompson’s due process rights, in a onesentence footnote: “Because we hold that the judge’s participation by
video-conference violated Rule 32.1, we need not address Thompson’s
argument that holding the hearing by videoconference violated the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.”78
IV. THE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF PAROLEES
The determination of what process is due to parolees continues to be a
fluid topic in American jurisprudence. Since the 1970s, federal courts
have continually attempted to define and interpret the constitutional
rights afforded to parolees.79
71. Thompson, 599 F.3d at 599.
72. Id.
73. Id.; FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(b)(2)(E).
74. Thompson, 599 F.3d at 599 (quoting United States v. Pitre, 504 F.3d 657, 662 (7th Cir.
2007)).
75. Id. at 599.
76. Id. at 600.
77. Id. at 601.
78. Id. at 601 n.6.
79. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 472 (1972) (defining the minimum due process
rights of a parolee); Gagnon v. Scarpelli 411 U.S. 778, 779 (1973) (deciding what right the parolee has
to counsel); United States v. Lloyd, 566 F.3d 341, 344 (3d Cir. 2009) (creating a balancing test for when
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A. The Minimum Due Process Rights of Parolees
In 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required a state to afford a parolee
some opportunity to be heard prior to revoking his or her parole.80 In
Morrissey v. Brewer, the Court consolidated two cases from the same
district court where parolees claimed to have received no hearing prior
to revocation of their parole.81 Both petitioners filed habeas corpus
petitions, alleging that their lack of procedure denied them due process
after the district court and the court of appeals held that due process did
not require a revocation hearing.82 The Supreme Court, however,
disagreed.83
Although the Court acknowledged that a parolee at a revocation
hearing is not entitled to the “full panoply of rights due a defendant” in a
criminal prosecution, the Court stated that “[r]evocation deprives an
individual . . . of the conditional liberty properly dependent on
observance of special parole restrictions.”84 At this time, approximately
35 to 45 percent of all parolees were subjected to revocation and
returned to prison; therefore, the Court acknowledged the importance of
parolees retaining their liberty as long as they substantially abide by
their supervised release conditions.85
In determining what process is due a parolee, the Court first examined
the nature of the parolee’s interest in his continued liberty and whether
this interest is within the contemplation of the Fourteenth Amendment.86
The extent to which an individual will be condemned to suffer grievous
loss is determinative of whether any procedural protections are due.87
Although parolees are not free to do as they please, the supervised
release enables them to engage in a wide range of activities that are
denied to an incarcerated person.88 As a result, the Court concluded,
a parolee has the right to confront an adverse witness).
80. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 472. The Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause states that that
state shall note “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV.
81. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 472–74.
82. Id. at 471, 474.
83. Id. at 481–90.
84. Id. at 480.
85. Id. at 479. As of 2005, approximately thirty-eight percent of all adults on federal or state
probation or parole supervision were returned to custody for violating their release conditions. See
Zucker, supra note 14, at 88 (citing Lauren E. Glaze & Thomas P. Bonzcar, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
PROB. AND PAROLE STATISTICS IN THE U.S., 2005 1–2 (2006), available at http://www.bjs.ojp.usdoj.
gov/content/pub/pdf/ppus05.pdf).
86. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481–82.
87. Id. at 481.
88. Id. at 482. A parolee can be gainfully employed and can be with family and friends. Id.
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“[T]he liberty of a parolee . . . includes many of the core values of
unqualified liberty and its termination inflicts a grievous loss on the
parolee” and “the liberty is valuable and must be seen as within the
protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.”89
The Court then turned its analysis to the nature of the process that is
due a parolee at a revocation hearing, wherein it laid out the minimum
requirements of due process.90 Accordingly, a parolee must have an
opportunity to be heard and to show either that he or she did not violate
the conditions of release or, alternatively, that there are mitigating
circumstances.91 Further, the Court held that the minimum requirements
of due process include, in pertinent part, the “(c) opportunity to be heard
in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; [and] (d)
the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the
hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing
confrontation).92
B. The Parolee’s Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel
Although Morrissey clearly enumerated various minimum due
process protections afforded to parolees, it did not decide whether a
parolee has the right to effective assistance of counsel.93 A year later,
though, the Court confronted the issue in Gagnon v. Scarpelli. In
Gagnon, the Court, while acknowledging that “the effectiveness of the
rights guaranteed by Morrissey may in some circumstances depend on
the use of skills which the probationer or parolee is unlikely to
possess,”94 determined that counsel should be provided on a case-by89. Id. (internal quotations omitted). The Court also determined that, even though the State has
an overwhelming interest in being able to return the individual to imprisonment without the burden of a
criminal trial, it has no interest in revoking parole without some informal procedural guarantees. Id. at
483. The Court further reasoned that society, not just the parolee, has a stake in parolees’ conditional
liberties. Id. at 483–84. Society has an interest in restoring parolees to normal, useful, lawful lives. Id.
at 484. Such rehabilitation is accomplished by not having parole revoked by erroneous information or
evaluation and by ensuring basic fairness. Id.
90. Id. at 484, 488–89. The Court also determined what due process requires at the arrest of the
parolee and the preliminary hearing. The Court determined that due process requires some minimal
inquiry as promptly as convenient after arrest and that this inquiry should be conducted by an
independent officer. Id. at 485–86. The independent officer should determine if reasonable grounds
exist for revocation of parole. Id. at 485. Also, the parolee should be given notice that the preliminary
hearing will take place and that its purpose is to determine whether there is probable cause to believe a
parole violation has been committed. Id. at 486–87.
91. Id. at 488.
92. Id. at 489.
93. Id.
94. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786 (1973). The Court acknowledged that “the unskilled
or uneducated probationer or parolee may well have difficulty in presenting his version of a disputed set
of facts where the presentation requires the examining or cross-examining of witnesses or the offering or
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case basis because there are “certain cases in which fundamental
fairness—the touchstone of due process—will require [the government
to] provide . . . counsel for indigent probationers or parolees.”95
Due process, according to the Court, requires that counsel be
provided in cases where parolees first exercise their right to request
counsel and then either claim that they have not committed the alleged
violation of their release conditions or that there were substantial
reasons that justified or mitigated the violation which are complex and
otherwise difficult for the parolee to develop or present.96 The judge
should also independently consider whether a parolee appears to be
capable of speaking effectively for him or herself.97
Although the determination of whether a parolee has the right to
counsel is determined on a case-by-case basis in the federal court
system,98 when the right does attach, so does the right to effective
assistance of counsel.99 Therefore, when the right to effective assistance
of counsel has been granted to a parolee, a violation of this right is a
constitutional violation.
In Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court set forth the standard
of proof for a defendant to argue ineffective assistance of counsel.100 To
demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show:
(1) that counsel’s performance was deficient, which requires a “showing
that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as
the counsel guaranteed the defendant,” and (2) that counsel’s deficient
performance prejudiced the defense, which can be demonstrated by the
dissecting of complex documentary evidence.” Id. at 787.
95. Id. at 788, 790. The Court acknowledged that the case-by-case approach has not worked for
criminal proceedings, citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), which established a per se rule
that provides defendants with the right to counsel. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 788. It then decided that the
case-by-case approach is not necessarily inadequate for revocation hearings because the hearings are
critically difference from criminal trials. Id. The Court focused on the fact that “a criminal
[proceeding] . . . is an adversary proceeding.” Id. at 788–89.
96. Ganon, 411 U.S. at 790.
97. Id. at 790–91. This is especially true in “doubtful cases.” Id.
98. This is not the standard in all jurisdictions. For example, “In Rhode Island a defendant who is
faced with the possible loss of liberty after a probation-violation hearing at which the court may order
him or her to serve all or a portion of a previously suspended sentence, has the right to the effective
assistance of counsel in connection with that hearing.” Hampton v. State, 786 A.2d 375, 380 (R.I.
2001). The Rhode Island Supreme Court acknowledged that the U.S. Supreme Court “has not yet
recognized the existence of a similar federal guaranty in connection with all probation-violation
hearings.” Id.
99. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685–86 (1984). According to the Supreme Court in
Strickland, “An accused is entitled to be assisted by an attorney, whether retained or appointed, who
plays the role necessary to ensure that the trial is fair. For that reason, the [Supreme] Court has
recognized that the right to counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel.” Id. (emphasis added).
100. The two-prong test established in Strickland is also used in the context of parolee challenges
to effective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Delong v. Snyder, No. 5:07-HC-2195-FL, 2008 WL
4510583, at *11 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 29, 2008).
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counsel’s errors being “so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair
trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”101 Furthermore, “the proper
standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective
assistance,” and “the defendant must show that counsel’s representation
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”102
However, there are some situations where the circumstances are so
likely to prejudice a defendant that the matter will not even be litigated
under the Strickland test, and a court will instead presume that counsel
was ineffective.103 In United States v. Cronic, decided the same day as
Strickland, the Court recognized that there sometimes will be occasions
when counsel is available, but “the likelihood that any lawyer, even a
fully competent one, could provide effective assistance of counsel is so
small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into
the actual conduct.”104 Some relevant factors, although not exhaustive,
may include how much time counsel had to prepare, counsel’s
experience, the gravity of the charge, the complexity of possible
defenses, and the accessibility of witnesses to counsel.105
C. The Parolee’s Right to Confront Adverse Witnesses
In Morrissey, the Supreme Court held that the minimum requirements
of due process at a parole revocation hearing include the right to
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.106 It noted that this right
101. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
102. Id. at 687–88.
103. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984).
104. Id. at 659–60.
105. Id. at 653.
106. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972). Because Morrissey determined that the right
to confront adverse witnesses is a due process right, the circuit courts of appeals have had to determine,
without guidance from the Supreme Court, whether the right to confront adverse witnesses applied to
parolees under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. The Confrontation Clause states, “In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . be confronted with the witnesses against
him.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The circuits that have addressed this issue include the Second, Eighth,
and Ninth Circuits. See United States v. Aspinall, 389 F.3d 332, 335 (2d Cir. 2004) (“On appeal,
Aspinall contends primarily that she . . . was denied . . . the right of confrontation by the admission of
hearsay evidence at her probation revocation hearing.”); United States v. Martin, 382 F.3d 840, 841(8th
Cir. 2004) (“Martin argues that the district court erred in permitting the government to present hearsay
evidence at the revocation hearing in violation of . . . his constitutional right to confront witnesses
against him.”); United States v. Hall, 419 F.3d 980, 982 (9th Cir. 2005) (“We must decide whether the
Sixth Amendment right to confront testimonial witnesses established in Crawford . . . applies to the
admission of hearsay evidence during revocation of supervised release proceedings.”). All three circuits
decided not to extend the Sixth Amendment to supervised release proceedings. See Aspinall, 389 F.3d
at 343 (“Nothing in Crawford, which reviewed a criminal trial, purported to alter the standards set by
Morrissey/Scarpelli or otherwise suggested that the Confrontation Clause principle enunciated in
Crawford is applicable to probation revocation proceedings.”); Martin, 382 F.3d at 844, 844 n.4 (“[T]he
constitutional standard applicable in this type of post-conviction revocation hearing will sometimes
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is not absolute and will be limited in a situation where the hearing
officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation.107
The Court, however, gave no further guidance as to how the right would
be limited, leaving the courts of appeals to determine its scope.108
In response, many circuits have constructed balancing tests to
determine when the right to confrontation is necessary, and when the
right must give way to a good cause finding to not allow
confrontation.109 In a recent decision that adopted the most common
balancing test, the Third Circuit in United States v. Lloyd noted that
“[d]ue process requires that [parolees] retain at least a limited right to
confront adverse witnesses in a revocation hearing.”110 Under this
balancing test, the presiding court must consider a parolee’s asserted
right to cross-examine adverse witnesses, balancing “the person’s
interest in the constitutionally guaranteed right to confrontation against
the government’s good cause for denying it.”111 Further, the presiding
court should “consider both the reliability of proffered hearsay and the
cause why a witness is not produced.”112
The Ninth Circuit employs the same balancing test and has
determined that a parolee’s interest in the right of confrontation depends
on two primary factors.113 In United States v. Comito, the court
determined that a parolee’s interest depends on the importance of the
hearsay evidence to the presiding court’s ultimate finding, as well as the
nature of the facts to be proven by the hearsay evidence.114 The court
held that “the more subject to question the accuracy and reliability of the
proffered evidence, the greater the [parolee’s] interest in testing it by
exercising his right to confrontation.”115
With regard to the government’s good cause, the determination of

permit the admission of evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible in a criminal prosecution” and
“[f]or this reason, Crawford . . . , involving the contours of the confrontation right in criminal
prosecutions, does not apply to the present case.”); Hall, 419 F.3d at 985 (“We reject Hall’s assertion
that Crawford extends the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation to revocation of supervised release
proceedings.”).
107. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489.
108. See Zucker, supra note 14, at 90.
109. See United States v. Lloyd, 566 F.3d 341, 344 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting that the First, Second,
Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have interpreted the due process rights enumerated in
Morrissey, and codified in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(b), to require a balancing test
considering “both the reliability of proffered hearsay and the cause why a witness is not produced”).
110. Id. at 343. The court referenced this due process right as derived from Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471 (1972). Lloyd, 566 F.3d at 343.
111. Lloyd, 566 F.3d at 343–44.
112. Id. at 344.
113. United States v. Comito, 177 F.3d 1166, 1170–71 (9th Cir. 1999).
114. Id. at 1171.
115. Id.
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what will suffice varies.116 “Whether a particular reason is sufficient
cause to outweigh the right to confrontation will depend on the strength
of the reason in relation to the significance of the [parolee’s] right.”117
Mere inconvenience or expense may be enough in some circuits.118 For
instance, in a previous Ninth Circuit decision, the court held that some
of the factors examined for good cause include the difficulty and
expense of procuring witnesses and the traditional indicia of reliability
borne by the evidence.119
V. DISCUSSION
The Thompson court’s decision to resolve the issue of whether the use
of videoconferencing to conduct a revocation hearing violates Rule 32.1
or the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause strictly on statutory
grounds appears to rest on the general principle of judicial restraint,
which urges courts to avoid reaching constitutional questions if statutory
analysis can be determinative.120 Although the court’s statutory analysis
reached the correct result in finding that videoconferencing violates a
parolee’s statutory rights, the due process rights that are harmed by the
use of the technology deserve the judiciary’s attention.
Statutory rights are malleable and open to interpretation, especially in
the absence of a clear explanation from Congress or the Supreme Court.
Other courts faced with this issue in the future may determine that Rule
32.1, or a similar state statute, does not require physical presence and,
therefore, may find that the use of videoconferencing technology does
not violate a parolee’s statutory rights.121 Also, the rule could be
amended to explicitly permit the practice.122
Because these possibilities are within the purview of the courts and
the legislature, the due process rights undermined by the use of
videoconferencing technology should be given full consideration. In
particular, courts should consider a parolee’s due process right to
effective assistance of counsel, as well as a parolee’s right to confront
adverse witnesses. Courts should also consider that the basic right the
videoconferencing issue centers on—specifically, whether a parolee’s
physical presence is required—largely impacts the effectiveness of all
other due process rights.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 1172.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Martin, 984 F.2d 308, 312 (9th Cir. 1993).
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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The Seventh Circuit in Thompson wisely noted that the Rule 32.1
right to be physically present is conjunctive in nature.123 The court
reasoned that other statutory rights owed to a parolee are effective only
if the right to be physically present is fulfilled.124 The statutory right to
be present is derived from the Supreme Court’s Morrissey decision,
which provided that a parolee’s minimum due process rights include the
“opportunity to be heard in person.”125 The Morrissey due process right,
even more clearly than Rule 32.1’s opportunity to appear, indicates that
physical presence is critical to a revocation hearing, and that physical
absence is violative of a parolee’s due process rights.
By requiring the opportunity to be heard in person,126 due process
requires, at the very minimum, that a parolee be physically present at a
revocation hearing. If a parolee is denied this right to be heard in
person,127 then other due process rights, including the right to effective
assistance of counsel and to confront adverse witnesses, could not be
effectuated in a manner that meets minimum due process requirements.
Therefore, these concomitant rights would likewise be violated.
A. The Parolee’s Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel
Videoconferencing technology at revocation hearings deprives a
parolee of the right to effective assistance of counsel. A parolee’s due
process right “to be heard in person”128 works in conjunction with the
parolee’s other due process rights. The right to effective assistance of
counsel is one of the rights that can be effectuated only by first ensuring
the parolee’s opportunity to be heard in person.129
When either the parolee or the judge virtually appears at a revocation
hearing, the effectiveness of the parolee’s counsel is in jeopardy.
Defense attorneys are put in a difficult position because they are forced
to choose between being with their client to ensure effective attorney–
client communications and being in the courtroom with the prosecutor
123. United States v. Thompson, 599 F.3d 595, 599 (7th Cir. 2010).
124. Id.
125. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972).
126. Id. (emphasis added).
127. In at least two scenarios, a defendant could be denied his right to be heard in person. A court
could find that videoconferencing qualified as “opportunity to appear” under Rule 32.1, see supra note
17 and accompanying text, or Congress could amend Rule 32.1 to allow for videoconferencing, see
supra note 18 and accompanying text.
128. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489.
129. Under some circumstances a court may determine that a parolee who has requested counsel
should not be provided with assistance. The court may determine that the parolee is capable of speaking
for himself effectively, or that parolee has not claimed his innocence or that there are mitigating
circumstances. However, for purposes of this discussion, we are assuming that the presiding court has
afforded the parolee the right to retain counsel, and, in turn, the right to effective assistance of counsel.
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so that their communication with the court is not disadvantaged.130
Whichever choice the defense attorney makes, the parolee’s right to
effective assistance of counsel is jeopardized.131
Defense counsel suffers a multitude of communication challenges
when not in the presence of the judge or the courtroom. Anne Bowen
Poulin, a law professor at the Villanova University School of Law,
stressed in her discussion of the use of videoconferencing technology
that “[t]he attorney will be unable to gauge the emotional interactions
and mood of the courtroom as effectively to determine when and how to
intervene on the client’s behalf.”132 She also examined various studies
that suggest that alliances form among those who are in the same
physical location—alliances against those who appear via
videoconference.133
In the case where neither the parolee nor counsel is physically present
at the revocation hearing, the effectiveness of counsel is even more
imperiled. The court in Thompson, although faced with the opposite
situation in which the judge appeared by videoconference, foresaw this
consequence134 and determined that “[t]he important point is that the
form and substantive quality of the hearing is altered when a key
participant is absent from the hearing room, even if he is participating
by virtue of a cable or satellite link.”135
The physical separation of a parolee from counsel inevitably takes its
toll on the effectiveness of the counsel, and this effect is most strongly
felt by the communication between them. Some courts have tried to
curb this problem by providing telephone lines that allow for privileged
communication.136 However, this practice still cannot replace the
quality of the attorney–client relationship created by in-person
interaction. According to Poulin, the human interactions that foster the
relationship are muted by the technology, which detracts from the
defendant’s experience.137
Likewise, counsel cannot gauge the
defendant’s mental and emotional state, and neither party can use

130. See Wiggins, supra note 9, at 737.
131. Id.
132. Anne Bowen Poulin, Criminal Justice and Videoconferencing Technology: The Remote
Defendant, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1089, 1131 (2004) (addressing the concerns raised by using
videoconferencing technology to avoid bringing criminal defendants to court).
133. Id. at 1132.
134. United States v. Thompson, 599 F.3d 595, 600 (7th Cir. 2010).
135. Id. The court went on to say that “[t]his is particularly true when the one who is absent has
the power to impose a prison term.” Id. However, I would argue that the effect is more substantial
when the parolee is the absent party because his due process rights are substantially affected, whereas
the judge is not being forced to forego his rights in a proceeding that risks his liberty.
136. Poulin, supra note 132, at 1129.
137. Id.
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nonverbal cues to communicate with each other during a proceeding,
both of which are necessary to effective communication.138
Despite the surplus of communication problems caused by the use of
videoconferencing technology, Poulin believes that these adversities will
not rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel in the eyes of the
courts.139 However, effective communication is so integral to the role of
counsel, and counsel’s ability to effectively assist a client, that it is
likely to be a key consideration when a court determines whether the
right to effective assistance of counsel has been violated by the use of
videoconferencing technology at a revocation hearing.
In fact, at least one court has recognized that the use of technology to
physically exclude a parolee from the courtroom, as well as from
counsel, violates the right to counsel because of the detrimental effect it
has on communication.140 In Schiffer v. State, the District Court of
Appeal of Florida heard an appeal from a revocation hearing and a
subsequent sentencing hearing in which the parolee participated via
video/audio arrangement. The court found that, because the parolee had
no means by which to access and to communicate privately with his
counsel, his right to counsel was “obliterated.”141 The court held that
“[w]e can imagine no more fettered and ineffective consultation and
communication between an accused and his lawyer than to do so by
television in front of a crowded courtroom with the prosecutor and judge
able to hear the exchange.”142
When a parolee is forced to appear at a revocation hearing by
videoconference while all other parties are in the courtroom, including
counsel, the parolee can fulfill the Strickland standard for ineffective
assistance of counsel. The lack of communication between counsel and
client when a parolee is separated from counsel ultimately results in the
counsel’s deficient performance. Because the parties cannot confer
privately, there is no opportunity for them to convene and strategize.
Even if the parties are able to confer privately beforehand and are
thereby able to create a satisfactory strategy, the communication lost
during the revocation hearing, including the nonverbal cues between
attorney and client, could result in deficient performance by counsel. In
such a situation, the attorney is incapable of reading the parolee’s body
language and other nonverbal cues during the proceeding, and therefore
cannot adjust accordingly.
A parolee can then show that this deficient performance prejudiced
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 1130.
Id. at 1129.
Schiffer v. State, 617 So. 2d 357, 358 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
Id.
Id. (quoting Seymour v. State, 582 So. 2d 127, 128 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1991)).
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the revocation hearing. As in Schiffer, the parolee can illustrate that this
inability to confer privately with counsel “obliterates” the parolee’s right
to effective assistance of counsel. If the parolee is unable to inform
counsel of all circumstances surrounding the hearing, then the counsel is
unable to create an effective defensive strategy, thereby prejudicing the
outcome of the case. Likewise, without the ability to confer privately,
or even the ability to signal the need to confer through nonverbal cues,
counsel is not able to alter the strategy during the proceeding.
Consequently, the counsel’s inability to create an effective defense
strategy as a result of the use of videoconferencing technology will
result in an unfair and unreliable revocation hearing.
However, the Strickland test need not apply when the parolee appears
alone by videoconference. Because the use of videoconferencing
technology that physically excludes a parolee from a revocation hearing
and from the physical presence of counsel is so likely to prejudice the
parolee, the Cronic presumption arises.143 Cronic raises a presumption
of ineffective assistance of counsel when even a competent lawyer
would be unlikely to effectively assist the parolee under the
circumstances.
A parolee can argue that an appearance by
videoconferencing so adversely affected the ability to communicate with
counsel that, even if the parolee’s counsel was perfectly competent,
counsel could not represent the parolee in a manner that would result in
a fair and just revocation hearing.
Therefore, under either Strickland or Cronic, the parolee will be able
to successfully demonstrate that the use of videoconferencing
technology to exclude the parolee from the revocation hearing violates
the due process right to effective assistance of counsel.
B. The Parolee’s Right to Confront Adverse Witnesses
The use of videoconferencing technology in revocation hearings also
violates the parolee’s due process right to confront adverse witnesses.
As with the right to effective assistance of counsel, the parolee’s due
process right “to be heard in person”144 works in conjunction with the
due process right to confront adverse witnesses. Without the parolee’s
physical presence, there is no effective right to confront adverse
witnesses that satisfies the minimum requirements of due process.
The Ninth Circuit addressed this issue in White v. White when it
considered whether a bar to the presence of an adverse witness at a
parole revocation hearing violated due process.145 Parolee White
143. See supra Part IV(B).
144. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972).
145. White v. White, 925 F.2d 287, 288 (9th Cir. 1991).
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contended that “the denial of his request to confront adverse witnesses at
his parole revocation hearing denied him due process,” and the court
agreed,146 The court held that “[w]here the facts are contested, the
presence of adverse witnesses, absent good cause for their
nonappearance, is necessary to enable the parole board to make accurate
findings.”147 Therefore, without good cause, the appearance or the
presence of adverse witnesses is necessary.
Similarly, an Ohio state appellate court found that the use of
videoconferencing technology violated a parolee’s due process right of
confrontation.148 In Wilkins v. Wilkinson, the parolee argued that
Morrissey’s minimal due process requirements were not met because the
government could not show good cause for forcing him to appear at his
revocation hearing via videoconference, separate from adverse
witnesses, thereby abridging his due process right of confrontation.
Further, the parolee argued that he could not even make eye contact
or observe the demeanor of the witnesses because of how the cameras
were situated and because they froze several times.149 The government
failed to demonstrate good cause, stating that its only reason for using
videoconferencing was to test the technology.150 The court agreed that,
because the government was unable to prove good cause, the parolee
could make a due process violation claim based on the use of
videoconferencing’s effect on his right to confront adverse witnesses.151
Under the balancing test used by many federal circuits, a parolee who
is forced to appear at his revocation hearing via videoconference without
good cause can successfully argue that the right of confrontation is
violated when adverse witnesses are physically in the courtroom. Under
this test, the presiding court must consider the parolee’s due process
rights, balanced against the government’s good cause for denying it.152
A parolee has a strong interest in the right to confront adverse
witnesses at a revocation hearing, a proceeding at which the parolee’s
liberty is at stake. The parolee, who will either want to argue innocence
or prove factors in mitigation, cannot effectively exercise a right of
confrontation when appearing via videoconference, away from the
physical presence of the adverse witnesses. Like in Wilkinson, a parolee
who can observe witnesses only on screen will not be able to observe
their demeanor and properly ascertain the accuracy and reliability of
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id.
Id. at 291 (emphasis added).
Wilkins v. Wilkinson, No. 01AP-468, 2002 WL 47051, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2002).
Id. at *2.
Id. at *2–3.
Id.
See United States v. Lloyd, 566 F.3d 341, 343 (3d Cir. 2009).
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their proffered evidence, evidence that is often determinative of the
parolee’s fate.
Once a parolee demonstrates the right of confrontation was violated,
the government must show good cause for “skyping in” the parolee. In
most of the cases involving the use of videoconferencing, the
government has argued that the technology was employed for reasons
such as convenience, efficiency, and cost and time savings.153 However,
these are not reasons that amount to “good cause” when balanced
against the parolee’s significant constitutional right to confrontation.
The government will also not be able to demonstrate good cause on the
grounds that witnesses are difficult and expensive to procure because
their presence in the courtroom indicates this is not true. The
government may be able to argue that the witness’s safety is at risk, or
that the witness at least perceives such a risk. However, if this were the
case, the witness could be the one appearing via videoconference instead
of prohibiting the parolee from being physically present at the
revocation hearing.
Therefore, given the strength of a parolee’s due process right of
confrontation, and the insufficiency, or even the complete absence of
good cause by the government, a parolee will be able to successfully
demonstrate successfully that the use of videoconferencing technology
to exclude the parolee from the revocation hearing violates the parolee’s
due process right to confront adverse witnesses.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although courts may resolve appeals from revocation hearing
decisions where parolees were forced to appear by videoconference by
looking to statutes for guidance, the concerning implications for
parolees’ due process rights should be given the judiciary’s full
attention.
The Seventh Circuit in United States v. Thompson
acknowledged that “virtual reality is rarely a substitute for actual
presence and . . . watching an event on the screen remains less than the
complete equivalent of actually attending it.”154 In the absence of direct
interpretation from Congress or the Supreme Court, courts confronted
with the issue of the use of videoconferencing technology should heed
the constitutional concerns raised by the practice.

153. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
154. United States v. Thompson, 599 F.3d 595, 601 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v.
Lawrence, 248 F.3d 300, 304 (4th Cir. 2001)).
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